Pakistan is exploring reintegrating banned extremist outfits into politics. Can it be done?

“Though Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD) is not listed as a political organization but it is a political entity, we want to register JuD as a political party. We played a positive role in the politics and we want to continue it,” said Hafiz Masood in Islamabad on March 27 this year.

Masood, brother of JuD chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, was speaking in a closed-door session on “Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Different Brands of Militants.” The discussion, organized by the think tank Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), centered on the reintegration of banned outfits like Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), and Ahle-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ).

Later, during a press briefing on April 26, the spokesman of the Pakistan Army, Major General Asif Ghafour, released a confessional video statement from Ehsanullah Ehsan, the former spokesman of the banned Jamat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), a splinter group of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

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According to Ehsan, India’s intelligence agency (the Research & Analysis Wing or RAW) and the Afghan intelligence arm National Directorate of Services (NDS) aim to destabilize Pakistan and both are funding anti-Pakistan elements.

The back-to-back crucial developments sparked a debate about the reintegration and mainstreaming of banned outfits in the country.

According to the National Counter Terrorism Authority, there are 64 banned outfits in Pakistan. These organizations were declared proscribed under section 11B (1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997. The section states that an organization is proscribed if “a) The Federal Government, having reason to believe that an organization is involved in terrorism, by order, lists it in the First Schedule; b) It operates under the name as an organization listed in the First Schedule or it operates under a different name; c) The First Schedule is amended by the Federal Government in any way to enforce proscription.”

The process of banning religious organizations in Pakistan kicked off back in 2001 when two violent sectarian outfits – Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and  Sipah-e-Muhammad – were proscribed by the Ministry of Interior (MoI).

Jamat-ud-Dawa and its charitable arm, Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (FIF) were recently included on the MoI watch list. The top leadership of JuD and FIF has been placed under house arrest, including JuD chief Hafiz Saeed. The crackdown on both organizations was carried out under section 11D (1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act:

Where the Federal Government, has reason to believe that an organization is acting in a manner it may be concerned in terrorism: 1) The organization may be kept under observation, if a) The name of the organization is listed in the Second Schedule by order of the Federal Government; or b) It operates under the same name as an organization listed in the second Schedule.

Earlier, media reported that a trained cadre of banned outfits will be inducted into the para-military forces. Background interviews conducted by The Diplomat suggest that the new policy was devised last year by the then-director general of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Lt. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar.

In April last year, he handed over two deradicalization plans to Nawaz Sharif, prime minister of Pakistan. The first proposal was to be implemented through the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the other was under the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). There was a role assigned to at least six different government departments in the proposed plan.

The proposal was to segregate different kinds of extremist on the basis of their history and nature of involvement in militancy. Some individuals are associated with the welfare work of banned outfits and some are part of the propaganda arm, while others actually take up arms against the state. Therefore, each individual would be reviewed according to his level of involvement in militant activities.

Pakistan is not the only country trying to develop a mechanism to rehabilitate militants. Deradicalization plans for repentant militants already exist in the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Yemen, Morocco, and Jordan adopted such plans much earlier. Pakistan has another significant example: neighboring Afghanistan, where Hezb-i-Islami has announced it will shun violence and join mainstream politics in the country. The United Nations lifted its ban on the Hezb-i-Islami chief, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, in February this year. The historic move was a result of a deal that was brokered between the Afghan government and Hekmatyar.

Pakistan is also running at least two deredicalization centers – Sabaon and Mashal – in the Sawat area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

Explaining the rationale of new proposed deredicalization program, retired Lt. Gen. Amjad Shoaib said that in January 2004, under orders from General (retd.) and then-President Pervez Musharraf, camps of banned outfits were dismantled and the militants were flushed out. It was a big blunder; for two years these men had been motivated and trained to wage jihad and then suddenly they were asked to vacate the area. “Those elements perceived that Pakistan betrayed the cause of Kashmir and [that’s when] Punjabi Taliban was formed. At that time nobody thought of starting a deradicalization program,” Shoaib explained.

Shuja Nawaz, a fellow at the Washington, DC-based South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council does not see rapid movement toward these goals given the lack of careful consideration of the deradicalization  and de-weaponizing of Pakistani society. He believes that ties between these shadowy jihadi groups and the political system prevent firm actions. Nawaz, who author of the book Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, says, “Mainstreaming can only occur when wider actions alter the school systems and curricula and to remove the vestiges of Ziaist [referring to General Zia-ul-Haq] policies and systems in both the civil and military are effected. That needs political gumption, a rare commodity in Pakistan today.”

There is a strong opinion that the reintegration of defunct outfits is unlikely. Because banned organizations are ideologically motivated, the chances of them abandoning their philosophy are slim. But contrary to this viewpoint, there is also a firm belief that the militant landscape of Pakistan is complex and threatening and requires a multi-fronted approach to neutralize the threat. A multi-pronged reintegration framework is important to neutralize the conventional militant groups and remove them from the terrorism landscape.

Yet if Pakistan moves forward, “India would be aghast,” Javed M. Ansari, executive editor of India Today, toldThe Diplomat. “It [would] be viewed as an attempt to legitimize organizations that are intrinsically anti-India.”

Ansari adds, “Mainstreaming might be a good idea theoretically but I don’t believe it’s possible. The raison d’être of such organizations is radicalization. For them to change would mean giving up the very basis of their existence. Therefore I do not believe that elements such as these [will] change their spots.”

Before reintegration of extremist or militants, there is a process of deradicalization and that, too, is a time consuming task, and a less understood one. Sometimes the exercise takes months, other times it continues for several years. In all cases, deradicalization focuses on the mental, behavioral and ideological transformation of the former militant.

While speaking to The Diplomat about the process of deradicalization and reintegration of defunct outfits, Shuja Nawaz was not optimistic. “Pakistan will have to remove the conditions that led to the categorization of these groups as terrorist entities to begin the process of altering how the U.S. and the international community view mainstreaming, howsoever defined,” he explained. “I am not sanguine about any progress. This will continue to hurt Pakistan without giving it any real advantage in dealing with its neighbors or the world at large.”

Many in the country believe that if these organizations renounce violence, submit themselves to the Constitution of Pakistan, and go through a rigorous exercise of deradicalization and debriefing, they should be allowed to kick off their political activities but the approach should be adopted under parliamentary oversight and should be limited to conventional groups like JuD, JeM, and some sectarian outfits.

“Are they prepared to support the constitution of Pakistan and renounce trying to change the political and religious system that is guaranteed by the constitution? Are they prepared to disarm and make their youth go through deradicalization programs? Are they prepared to carry out reform in their educational systems and the madrassas they control? Are they prepared to be useful to the state instead of promoting religious extremism? That appears difficult. If they are prepared to carry out this long list of what needs to be done and fulfill all the articles of the National Action Plan, there is every possibility that they could join the political process,” stated acclaimed writer and journalist Ahmed Rashid.

The Central Goods and Services Tax Bill, 2017

The Central Goods and Services Tax Bill, 2017 was introduced in Lok Sabha on March 27, 2017.  The Bill provides for the levy of the Central Goods and Services Tax (CGST). Levy of CGST:  The centre will levy CGST on the supply of goods and services within the boundary of a state.  Supply include sale, transfer and lease made for a consideration to further a business. Tax rates: The tax rates of CGST will be recommended by the GST Council.  This rate will not exceed 20%.  In addition, the Bill allows certain taxpayers whose turnover is less than Rs 50 lakh to pay GST at a flat rate on turnover (known as composition levy), instead on the value of supply of goods and services.  This rate will be capped at 2.5%. Exemptions from CGST: The centre may exempt certain goods and services from the purview of GST through a notification.  This will be based on the recommendations of the GST Council. Liability to pay CGST: The liability to pay CGST in relation to supply of goods and services will arise on the date of: (i) issue of invoice, (ii) receipt of payment, whichever is the earliest. Taxable amount (value of supply): CGST will be levied on the supply of goods and services, whose value includes: (i) price paid on the supply; (ii) taxes and duties levied under a different tax law; (iii) interest, late fee, penalties for delayed payments, among others.  Input tax credit: Every taxpayer while paying taxes on outputs, may take credit equivalent to taxes paid on inputs.  However, this will not be applicable on supplies related to: (i) personal consumption, (ii) supply of food, outdoor catering, health services, etc.  Registration: Every person who makes supply of goods and services and whose turnover exceeds Rs 20 lakh will have to register in every state where he conducts business.  The turnover threshold is Rs 10 lakh for special category states.  Returns: Every taxpayer would have to self-assess and file tax returns on a monthly basis by submitting: (i) details of supplies provided, (ii) details of supplies received, and (iii) payment of tax.  In addition to the monthly returns, an annual return will have to be filed by each taxpayer. Refunds and welfare fund: Any taxpayer may apply for refund of taxes in cases including: (i) payment of taxes in excess, or (ii) unutilized input tax credit.  Upon such application, the refund may be credited to the taxpayer, or to a Consumer Welfare Fund.  The Fund will be used for the purpose of consumer welfare. Prosecution and appeals: For offences such as mis-reporting of: (i) goods and services supplied, or (ii) details furnished in invoices, a person may be fined, imprisoned, or both by the CGST Commissioner.  Such orders can be appealed before the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal, and further before the High Court. Transition to the new regime: Taxpayers with unutilised input tax credit obtained under the current laws such as CENVAT may utilise it under GST.  In addition, businesses may also avail input tax credit on stock purchased before the start of implementation of GST. Anti-profiteering measure: The central government may by law set up an authority or designate an existing authority to examine if reduction in tax rate has resulted in commensurate reduction in prices of goods and services.  The powers of the authority will be prescribed by the government. Compliance rating: Every taxpayer shall be assigned a GST compliance rating score based on his record of compliance with the provisions of this Bill.  The compliance rating score will be updated at periodic intervals and be placed in the public domain.

Will the GCC Survive?

As is well known, the current crisis in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was caused by the June 5 decision of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt, followed later by a few others, to cut off diplomatic relations as well as trade and transport links with Qatar. Well-wishers of the GCC, which had escaped the ravages of what started as the Arab Spring in 2011, have reason to be deeply disappointed.

The crisis is getting worse by the day primarily for two reasons. First, Qatar’s adversaries seem determined to punish it whatever be the cost thereof in terms of regional stability, peace, and the suffering caused to people in the GCC and elsewhere. Second, Washington, which alone has the clout to intervene and, if need be, impose a settlement in its own interest, appears to be incapable of coherent and rational action under President Trump who has signalled a policy contradicting that of his own Secretaries of State and Defense. Without indulging in untenable counterfactual thinking, anyone could have seen that had Obama been in the White House, Secretary Kerry would have undertaken shuttle diplomacy and ended the current crisis within days. That such a settlement might have been cosmetic and that the underlying causes and complaints might have remained is a different matter. In diplomacy, one is not always looking for a permanent cure. The first priority is to put out the raging fire.

A major diplomatic error has been committed by whosoever thought of sending an ultimatum. A public ultimatum prevents a settlement since ‘face saving’ becomes more difficult. It seems that it is the US Department of State which first came out publicly asking for a list of complaints in writing. On June 20, the Department’s spokesperson Heather Nauert bluntly questioned the motives of Saudi Arabia and UAE for their boycott of Doha, saying it was “mystified” as the Gulf states had not released their grievances regarding Qatar. But earlier, on June 16, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir had said that a list of ‘demands’ was under preparation.

The fault of the US Department of State is that it failed to figure out that demands written and public can complicate mediation. It should have advised Saudi Arabia not to go public with its concrete demands. Here, it is important to note that Trump, by reducing the State Department’s budget, has virtually decimated it. The Secretary of State lacks senior aides with professional experience to advise him.

The following is an unofficial translation of the demands put out by Al Jazeera:

List of demands by Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations
1. Scale down diplomatic ties with Iran and close the Iranian diplomatic missions in Qatar, expel members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard and cut off military and intelligence cooperation with Iran. Trade and commerce with Iran must comply with US and international sanctions in a manner that does not jeopardize the security of the GCC.
2. Immediately shut down the Turkish military base, which is currently under construction, and halt military cooperation with Turkey inside of Qatar.

This is counter revolution 2.0. This is the second phase of the attack on the Arab Spring and what’s left of it, which is very little.

3. Sever ties to all "terrorist, sectarian and ideological organizations," specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIL, Al Qaeda, Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as the Nusra Front) and Lebanon's Hezbollah. Formally declare these entities as terror groups as per the list announced by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Egypt, and concur with all future updates of this list.
4. Stop all means of funding for individuals, groups or organisations that have been designated as terrorists by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Bahrain, US, and other countries.
5. Hand over "terrorist figures", fugitives and wanted individuals from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain to their countries of origin. Freeze their assets, and provide any desired information about their residency, movements and finances.
6. Shut down Al Jazeera and its affiliate stations.
7. End interference in sovereign countries' internal affairs. Stop granting citizenship to wanted nationals from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain. Revoke Qatari citizenship for nationals where such citizenship violates those countries' laws.
8. Pay reparations and compensation for loss of life and other financial losses caused by Qatar's policies in recent years. The sum will be determined in coordination with Qatar.
9. Align Qatar's military, political, social and economic policies with other Gulf and Arab countries as per the 2014 agreement reached with Saudi Arabia.
10. Cease contact with the political opposition in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain. Hand over files detailing Qatar’s prior contact with and support for opposition groups, and submit details of their personal information and the support Qatar has provided them.
11. Shut down all news outlets funded directly and indirectly by Qatar, including Arabi21, Rassd, Al Araby Al Jadeed, Mekameleen and Middle East Eye, etc.
12. Agree to all the demands within 10 days of the list being submitted to Qatar, or the list will become invalid.
13. Consent to monthly compliance audits in the first year after agreeing to the demands, followed by quarterly audits in the second year, and annual audits in the following 10 years.

Upon reading the list, it is difficult not to recall another ultimatum, couched in equally arrogant style, delivered way back in 1914 by the Austro-Hungarian Empire to Serbia. That ultimatum was couched in a language calculated to ensure rejection. Three days after the deadline of July 25 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia triggering the First World War.

Fortunately, we need not fear any immediate outbreak of hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. UAE has made it clear that there is no scope for discussion and that if Qatar does not do what it is asked to do there would be a ‘parting of ways’.

What are the implications of the words “parting of ways”? The GCC will get weaker with Qatar out; and Oman and Kuwait will be offended that their mediation efforts were spurned. The Turkish military base in Qatar will get fortified. Qatar and Iran will get closer. Iran’s regional clout will increase.

There is another potential peril. If Iran’s clout increases, how will Saudi Arabia’s new Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman respond? He took the lead in starting Operation Decisive Storm by invading Yemen in March 2015. It has been far from decisive and Riyadh is chasing a mirage of military victory at an atrocious cost in human lives and human misery.

What complicates the situation further is the unpredictable President Trump. He wants to undo as much of the Obama legacy as possible and is keen to cancel the nuclear deal with Iran. He says that Iran is the source of international terrorism. The troubling question is whether, unwittingly or not, the US President and the Saudi Crown Prince will start a war against Iran and set fire to the rather inflammable region?
Barbara Tuchman in her seminal book The March of Folly wrote:

A phenomenon noticeable throughout history regardless of place or period is the pursuit by governments of policies contrary to their own interests. Mankind, it seems, makes a poorer performance of government than of almost any other human activity. In this sphere, wisdom, which may be defined as the exercise of judgment acting on experience, common sense and available information, is less operative and more frustrated than it should be. Why do holders of high office so often act contrary to the way reason points and enlightened self-interest suggests? Why does intelligent mental process seem so often not to function?”

Let us pray and hope for good sense to prevail. It is unrealistic and rather naïve to expect Qatar to surrender. Any attempt at engineering a coup in Qatar is unlikely to succeed. It is not beyond diplomacy to work out a face-saving formula and end the present crisis after which the GCC can work it out among themselves over a period of time on the basis of a discreet and unpublicized give-and-take. The demand for the shutting down of Al Jazeera is not getting much approbation internationally, to put it mildly.

Egypt’s involvement has only made finding a solution more difficult. This crisis is best resolved within the GCC for which Kuwait and Oman have exerted themselves. If that does not work out, Washington should discharge its responsibilities as early as possible. The fire brigade does not wait for the fire to spread before initiating action.

Unpacking China’s White Paper on Maritime Cooperation under BRI

The revival of the centuries-old ‘Silk Road at Sea’ into a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is an integral part of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It has been flagged by China as a Chinese solution to global economic revival. The Silk Road Economic Belt on land connects China to Europe through Central Asia, while the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) at sea connects China to the European Market through the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. In keeping with the proclaimed tenor of the BRI initiative, on 20 June 2017, China unveiled a white paper on “Vision towards enhancing maritime cooperation in building a peaceful and prosperous 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”. The vision document, prepared by China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and State Oceanic Administration (SOA), outlined that “China is willing to work closely with countries along the Road, engage in all-dimensional and broad-scoped maritime cooperation and build open and inclusive cooperation platforms, and establish a constructive and pragmatic Blue Partnership to forge a “blue engine” for sustainable development.”1 Notwithstanding constant reiteration from China about the centrality of the economic dimension in the Belt and Road initiative, there has been a constant focus by commentators about its sublime geostrategic design.2

The vision on maritime cooperation outlined by the White Paper (MSR Vision 2017) is largely a reiteration of the vision for the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road proclaimed in March 2015 (BRI Vision 2015).3 However, MSR 2017 also contains several new elements. This article unpacks the Chinese proposals for enhancing maritime cooperation along the MSR. “Blue Economy” and “Sustainable Development” are largely advertorial embellishments in the document. The vision document considers maritime security cooperation as a lynchpin in the MSR and attempts to redesign the existing maritime security architecture in the oceanic arena of MSR. The proposed Asia Africa Growth Corridor, a joint initiative of India and Japan, needs to take into account the extant Chinese vision on maritime cooperation in order to provide a viable alternative.

Expanding Maritime Horizon of Belt and Road Initiatives

The original blueprint for the belt and road initiative had just one belt on land and one road at sea. The belt provided connectivity between China and Europe through Central Asia while the maritime road catered for oceanic connectivity of China, Africa and Europe through the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. The white paper on Maritime Cooperation under BRI envisages three oceanic passages, which include: the originally envisaged China-Indian Ocean-Africa- Mediterranean Sea Blue Economic Passage; the blue economic passage of China-Oceania-South Pacific travelling southward from the South China Sea into the Pacific Ocean; and, a future blue economic passage to Europe via the Arctic Ocean.

In addition to these are the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC). both connected with China-Indian Ocean-Africa- Mediterranean Sea Blue Economic Passage. Thus, the 21st century Maritime Silk Road has a much larger oceanic canvas than originally envisaged. The linking of CPEC and BCIM within the wider framework of the Maritime Silk Road has been objected to by India,4 which had earlier boycotted the inaugural Belt and Road Forum due to sovereignty concerns given that CPEC transits Indian Territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.5

Focus on Sustainable Blue Enterprise – Rhetoric or Reality

A focus on sustainable development and environmental protection in planning major industrial and infrastructure projects is mandatory due to concerns about climate change. The BRI Vision 2015 has also articulated similar phraseology of sustainable and environment-friendly approach for the projects envisaged under the initiative’s auspices. The extant vision on maritime cooperation under BRI has been embellished with phrases such as ‘blue economic passage’, ‘developing the blue economy’, ‘blue economy partnership’, ‘blue partnership’, ‘blue engine for sustainable growth’, ‘blue carbon ecosystem’, ‘blue carbon forum’, and ‘blue carbon report’. The word count of ‘Blue’ is the second highest at 30 in the document and the most repeated word is ‘Economy’ or its variations at 34 times. In essence, it indicates the Chinese commitment for the environment in the envisaged economic outreach in the maritime arena.

The environment commitment is further asserted through a focus on scientific research cooperation with littoral countries along the road as well as the setting up of regional institutions for marine environment protection and monitoring. Thus, the vision states that China has proposed “the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Blue Carbon Program to monitor coastal and ocean blue carbon ecosystems, develop technical standards and promote research on carbon sinks, launch the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Blue Carbon Report, and to establish an International Blue Carbon Forum and cooperation mechanism.”

This promise of environmental protection in the BRI is certainly in line with China’s voluntary commitments undertaken as part of the Paris Climate Change agreement. However, Chinese practices in the recent past have indicated scant regard for environmental concerns in domestic developmental activities, reclamations in the South China Sea and overseas investment. The Hague Tribunal, in its ruling on the South China Sea, had castigated China for causing severe harm to the coral reef environment as well as for violating its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species.6 China’s island-building spree and its mobilisation of its ravenous fishing fleet have resulted in the deliberate destruction of the marine ecosystem and impaired the long-term sustainability of the marine environment around the South China Sea.7 China’s domestic policies have prioritised development over environmental concerns with harrowing results.8

China’s investments in Africa are concentrated in sectors which are environmentally sensitive (such as oil and gas exploration, mining, hydropower, and timber), and the resultant environmental damage has drawn sharp criticism.9 With the tightening of the domestic law on pollution, China may even incentivise the relocation of its most polluting industries to Africa where enforcement of environmental measures is weak.10 A Chinese scholar has justified such export of pollution and recommends that “Energy-hungry and polluting manufacturers may well be the first to move from China to Africa.”11 Whether the environmental friendly assurance of the vision in implementing envisaged maritime projects will become a reality can be assessed only when projects are implemented on the ground. However, there exist sufficient reasons for healthy scepticism in this regard at present.

Encouragement to Chinese Enterprises

The Silk Road Vision document aims to promote the participation of Chinese enterprises in maritime infrastructure projects, industrial parks and trade cooperation zones in the littoral countries along the maritime Silk Road. The Belt and Road Initiative has been proclaimed as a stimulus for global and regional economic growth. However, it has been argued that this initiative could be seen as an attempt to redirect surplus capital and industrial overcapacity in order to solve the prevalent structural problem of the Chinese economy.12 Several studies have also questioned the economic viability and pointed to the associated political risks of the belt and road initiative.13This apparent promotion of Chinese enterprises in the maritime cooperation vision document could be for two reasons. One, the productive use of surplus capital and industrial overcapacity. And two, it aims to address the growing risk aversion plaguing Chinese institutions in investing in far-flung projects with uncertain financial returns and political risks.14

Networks for Perception Management

Perception management for “garnering public support for intensifying ocean cooperation” seems to be an important area in the maritime cooperation vision. Key activities in this area include a network of Chinese and regional research institutions and think tanks, a “circle of friends” in media, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), and liaison networks for maritime law enforcement agencies. These networks would facilitate research cooperation, training and education, cultural exchanges, cross-border interviews through funding from China. The vision document elaborates detailed programmes for the development of these networks. A collaborative approach is aimed to lay a solid foundation of public support for the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. China aims to promote Matsu Folk culture for the Maritime Silk Road’s spirit of friendly cooperation including cooperation.

Maritime Security Assurance –The Lynchpin

The vision document identifies maritime security as a “key assurance for developing the blue economy” and aims to promote “the concept of common maritime security”. Four areas of maritime security cooperation in the vision document are:-

• Cooperation on Maritime navigation security to combat non-traditional security issues such as crime at sea.
• Cooperation with littoral countries in the application of the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System and remote sensing satellite system has also been proposed.
• Conducting joint maritime search and rescue missions to enhance capacities in dealing with emergencies at sea including major disasters and security threats to tourists.
• Cooperation on Marine disaster warning and mitigation through “setting up of marine disaster warning systems in the South China Sea, the Bengal Sea, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden” and development of “marine disaster warning products for transportation, escort, disaster prevention and mitigation.” (Emphasis added).

It has been argued that the Belt and Road initiative is primarily driven by broad geostrategic aims15and China is using economic power in pursuit of geopolitical objectives in this initiatives.16However, the broad contours of maritime security cooperation in the Silk Road vision clearly indicate China’s willingness to use its maritime power for the protection of its expanding maritime interests and sea lanes, albeit in the extant case, under the guise of enhancing maritime cooperation on non-traditional issues.

China’s naval strategy has progressively evolved from a “near-coast defence” strategy prior to the mid-1980s to a “near-seas active defence” after the mid-1980s, and then to the advancement of a “far-seas operations” strategy by the mid-2000s.17 Hu Jintao provided the concept of ‘New Historic Mission’ which argued that the PLA must go beyond its previous mission of safeguarding national “survival interests” protecting national “development interests”.18 China’s Military Strategy 2015 provided greater emphasis on “open seas protection" and highlighted “long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests.” The role of the PLA-Navy was augmented to include “participation in both regional and international security cooperation and effectively secure China's overseas interests”.19 The contours of the burgeoning Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has been evident through the near permanent presence of PLA Navy in the Gulf of Aden, deployment of submarines, the under construction naval base at Djibouti, and the planned deployment of Marines at Gwadar and Djibouti. The vision provides a broad design for the further expansion of China’s maritime power in the IOR and beyond.

Contrasting Visions: Maritime Silk Road vs Asia Africa Growth Corridor

During the recently held annual general meeting of the African Development Bank (AfDB) at Gandhinagar on May 24, 2017, India and Japan unveiled the vision document for an “Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC)” which aims to enhance growth and connectivity between Asia and Africa with a focus on four areas: Development Cooperation Projects, Quality Infrastructure and Institutional Connectivity, Enhancing Skills, and People-to-People Partnership. Priority areas for development cooperation include health and pharmaceuticals, agriculture and agro-processing, disaster management and skill enhancement.20 The AAGC seeks synergy between India’s “Act East” Policy and Japan’s “Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure ” in order to improve growth and interconnectedness between and within Asia and Africa for realising a free and open Indo-Pacific region.21 Japan’s contribution to the project will be its state-of-the-art technology and ability to build quality infrastructure, while India will bring in its expertise of working in Africa. The private sector of both countries is expected to play a big role by coming together to form joint ventures and consortiums and take up infrastructure, power or agribusiness projects in Africa.22This Indo-Japan initiative is being seen as a counter to the Belt and Road initiative. AAGC is being presented as a “distinct initiative” borne out of a consultative process which would be profitable and bankable, unlike the “government-funded model” of Belt and Road initiatives.23

The vision document of both initiatives explicitly covers the same ground, viz., economic connectivity through maritime infrastructure, pairing of ports for mercantile trade, environmental friendly approach, sustainable development goals, institutional connectivity, people to people contacts, etc. However, unlike the near global vision of the Maritime Silk Road, AAGC is limited in its geographical span. The AAGC espouses the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model in contrast to the government funded approach of the Maritime Silk Road. Unlike the encouragement to Chinese Enterprises in the Maritime Silk Road, the AAGC vision document does not mention any preferential treatment to Indian or Japanese enterprises. And, the Chinese vision document is more detailed in terms of specific activities and programmes envisaged in comparison to the AAGC vision document which has a rather broad brush approach.

One of the crucial missing links in the AAGC vision document is the aspect of maritime security cooperation even though the India-Japan Joint Statement of November 11, 2016, placed at the appendix of the document, acknowledges the imperatives of maritime security cooperation. It is apparent that the consultative approach of the AAGC vision has not included the views of experts from the maritime security domain. It is hoped that the Research Support Unit assigned for the preparation of the Asia Africa Growth Corridor Study between 2017-2018 would include aspects of enhancing maritime security cooperation within the ambit of AAGC along with a more detailed exploration of projects envisaged.24

Conclusion

Beyond the semantic embroidery of collaborative development for a Blue Economy, China’s vision document on maritime security cooperation under BRI contains an even more expanded 21st Century Maritime Silk Road which now expands beyond the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea to include the Pacific and Arctic Oceans. However, at the core of the vision lies an elaborate framework of a cooperative maritime security architecture for protection of sea lanes of MSR. Through the assurance of maritime security under a cooperative framework as an ‘international public good’, China aims to solve its vexing strategic challenge of securing its expanded sea lanes. China’s expanding maritime influence in the IOR certainly poses a challenge to prevailing regional maritime security mechanisms (viz., IORA, IONS, BIMSTEC etc.) in general and to India in particular. The extant vision envisages promotion of the Chinese Baideu navigation system. A network of ocean observation systems along with the creation of a liaison network for maritime security further accentuates this strategic concern. The Chinese vision document on maritime cooperation broadly confirms the assessment about the country’s intention to further militarise economic policy in order to defend its ambitious global outreach, which is, as of now, being marketed as as a benign endeavour.

India has been proactively engaging with countries in its maritime neighbourhood at bilateral and multilateral levels. There is growing recognition of its role as a ‘net security provider’ in the IOR. India has clearly informed China about its sensitivities regarding CPEC and has objected to the linking of CPEC and BCIM corridor with the MSR. However, it must be noted that India’s maritime outreach will progressively face even bigger competitive challenges from Chinese initiatives under MSR not only in the economic arena but also in maritime geopolitics. India certainly needs a whole of government approach and proactive engagement with like-minded countries to evolve a suitable strategy to ensure a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific”.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

The latest U.S.-North Korean tensions could be turned into a diplomatic opportunity

The tragic death of Otto Warmbier, the 22-year-old American student who was imprisoned and later released while in a state of coma by North Korea, is a huge setback to hopes for dialling down tensions between Washington and Pyongyang. The Korean crisis has worsened since President Donald Trump took office early this year. North Korea test-fired a number of missiles in defiance of international pressure, while the United States issued repeated warnings. Mr. Trump had put pressure on Beijing to rein Pyongyang in, and even praised it for its efforts. But the pressure does not seem to be working, with North Korea continuing with its nuclear missile programme. This was the backdrop to the release of Warmbier. He was arrested in Pyongyang in January 2016 while visiting as part of a tour group and later sentenced to 15 years of hard labour for the “hostile act” of trying to steal a propaganda poster. Within a few days of his release he died. The fallout in the U.S. is predictably charged. The Trump administration has flayed the North Korean regime for Warmbier’s death, but stopped short of calling for more sanctions or issuing new threats. This may be because three other Americans are still imprisoned in North Korea, and Washington’s priority for now is to secure their release.

On the face of it, this may not seem like the ideal time to advocate diplomacy. But it is worthwhile for Washington to ask whether its hostile policy towards North Korea has produced any positive result. The sanctions-only approach has not helped change Pyongyang’s behaviour. In fact, the longstanding hostility and Washington’s repeated threats have turned the Kim dynastic regime so paranoid that it doesn’t spare even American tourists visiting North Korea. Attempts to put pressure on Pyongyang through Beijing have also failed — either because China is not completely on board or it is simply reluctant to use its leverage over North Korea. Using force or attempting a regime change, a strategy that has not worked for the U.S. elsewhere, will be far more dangerous in the Korean Peninsula given that the North is an unpredictable nuclear power. This situation leaves Mr. Trump with only one viable option: to take the lead in a new diplomatic offensive with both carrots and sticks. Officials from Washington and Pyongyang had already established low-level contact for the release of Warmbier and the other three Americans who are still in North Korean custody. Mr. Trump could use the crisis as an opportunity to expand the engagement, get the Americans freed and then gradually start discussing more complex issues. The new South Korean President, Moon Jae-in, is an advocate of talks and has vowed to roll back the hostile foreign policy of his predecessor. If China also backs such an effort wholeheartedly, Mr. Kim would have to unequivocally demonstrate whether he is interested in peace or not.

The BJP has managed to set the tone and agenda for the presidential race

 It may have the trappings of an ideological battle, but the 2017 presidential election has become a platform for political messaging. With the Bharatiya Janata Party fielding an old party hand from the Dalit community, the opposition parties led by the Congress felt constrained to follow suit. While the candidature of Bihar Governor Ram Nath Kovind on behalf of the ruling party was a surprise, the response from the opposition in naming former Lok Sabha Speaker Meira Kumar was anything but that. This lent the unfortunate impression that the Congress and other parties had no clear choice of their own, and were only waiting to react. They may have hoped that the BJP would field someone from its old guard, in order to set the stage for a contest between a candidate ‘swathed in saffron’ and one with a secular report card. However, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and BJP president Amit Shah chose someone less known but from a disadvantaged community, with the clear intent of garnering the support of those outside the fold of the National Democratic Alliance, who cannot afford to be seen to be opposing a Dalit. As it happened, the Bahujan Samaj Party leader, Mayawati, felt obliged to extend her support to Mr. Kovind, until the Congress and its allies came up with the name of Ms. Kumar, daughter of the late leader of the depressed classes, Babu Jagjivan Ram. It is clear that the opposition’s tactic of waiting for the ruling party to name its candidate did not exactly help its cause. It only gave an opportunity to the BJP leadership to set the tone and agenda for the contest.

The election result is a foregone conclusion. On the strength of its majority in the Lok Sabha and several legislatures, especially its huge presence in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly, the BJP’s nominee is well ahead. His position is bolstered by the support of a clutch of regional parties in Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Odisha and Tamil Nadu, but the most important coup that the BJP has pulled off by fielding the Bihar Governor is the backing of Janata Dal (United) leader and Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar. The only political point of interest in the current election lies in the possibility that it may result in a realignment in Bihar. Mr. Kumar may be weighing the fallout of being seen in the company of the Rashtriya Janata Dal leader, Lalu Prasad, whose family is now embroiled in allegations of benami property transactions. There also appears to be a competition among regional parties such as the Telugu Desam Party, the Telangana Rashtra Samithi, the YSR Congress and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam factions to support the Narendra Modi regime. The normally restive Shiv Sena too has chosen to back Mr. Kovind. Even with 17 parties in the opposition ranks, there may be only a symbolic contest.

Any attempt to improve our cities depends on how data are compiled and shared

The Centre would like us to believe that the Smart Cities Mission will transform urban life in the agglomerations that enter the elite club. With the latest inclusions, there are 90 cities in the list, each of which proposes to turn ‘smart’, utilising core funding from the Centre and other resources. By all accounts, the provision of basic services in urban India has been worsening, and this is clearly reflected in the winning city proposals: 81 of the selected plans seek funds for affordable housing, new schools and hospitals, and redesign of roads. This is at best a partial list, and there are many more aspects to achieving inclusivity. There is a high-visibility campaign around the Smart Cities Mission, but there is little evidence to suggest that State and local governments have either the fine-grained data or the capability to analyse them in order to understand the evolving needs of their communities. The Centre has apparently decided to skirt such a fundamental problem by adopting a ‘managed urbanisation’ approach in the chosen cities, with the powers of municipal councils delegated to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), under the Companies Act, that will act in its own wisdom. Given that this is the model adopted by the two-year-old Mission, the Centre must present a status report on what the SPVs have achieved so far. 

Any serious attempt at improving the quality of life in cities would depend on how governments approach data. It would be smart, for instance, to use sensors to estimate the flow of vehicles and pedestrians, and create smartphone applications for the public to report on a variety of parameters. Making such data open would enable citizens’ groups to themselves come up with analyses to help city administrators make decisions, boost transparency and make officials accountable. There are several international examples now, such as the Array of Things sensors being installed on Chicago streets, which let people download the raw data on air quality, transport, pedestrian movement and standing water. Although India’s Smart Cities Mission has identified more than 20 priority areas, interventions by the respective agencies are weak. Access to special funding should make it mandatory for all public transport providers — city bus corporations, Metro Rail and suburban trains — to provide real-time passenger information in the form of open data, an inexpensive global standard that raises both access and efficiency through smartphone applications. Making street-level waste management data public would lead to a heat map of the worst sites, compelling managers to solve the problem. Clearly, there is a lot of low-hanging fruit on the road to smartness, and a nimble policy approach can tap this quickly. More importantly, the ideology that guides the plan should recognise that the vibrant life of cities depends on variety and enabling environments, rather than a mere technology-led vision. Pollution-free commons, walkability and easy mobility, with a base of reliable civic services, is the smart way to go.

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