The problem isn’t Delhi. It’s the Taliban by Rikomht

To engage or not with the Taliban has become an urgent question in India. The withdrawal of the United States (US) military from Afghanistan followed by the Taliban’s offensives across the country, and China’s diplomatic courting of the group has intensified the debate whether New Delhi should “openly” talk with the group or not. Given reports about India’s silent outreach to the Taliban in Doha, this issue requires unpacking beyond the realpolitik versus moralpolitik binary.

There are compelling reasons why India must engage with the Taliban. The group, in its entire tribal diversity and reliance on Pakistan, is essential to Afghanistan’s politics, and India will have to somehow deal with the Taliban. But there is an equally powerful case to be made that the violence and misogyny of the Taliban must not be encouraged by India, even if the world is doing so and despite Kabul’s struggles to deliver on promises of political inclusivity and social progressiveness.

But this choice is not just of India’s to make. The Taliban’s Rahbari Shura, or the leadership council, faces an acute dilemma on the “India question”. Unlike talking to Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, London, and Washington DC — none of whom Islamabad, the Taliban’s principal patron, has an enduring rivalry with — the Taliban’s international ambitions hit a roadblock when it comes to New Delhi. This is primarily because of the enduring India-Pakistan rivalry, which shows few signs of resolution, and Islamabad’s demand for an India-minus Afghanistan.

From this perspective, as seen in the largely understanding responses to the limited outreach in Doha, India is more capable of handling and sustaining “open” talks with the Taliban than the other way round.

To be seen in public with Indian leadership will cost the Taliban heavily. Islamabad will either reduce financial and armed support, or, more likely, target those Taliban figures who it believes have a proclivity to engage with India. Such signalling was clear when Pakistan’s national security adviser Moeed Yusuf sought India to be “ashamed” for talking to the Taliban. Yusuf’s public messaging was accompanied by an uptick in anti-India propaganda on the Afghan battlefield and in Taliban-centric social media networks.

a moment when the Taliban is making strides both on the battlefield and the negotiating table, there is little appetite in the Rahbari Shura to complicate relations with Pakistan for India’s sake. This is despite the desire among Taliban leaders to carve an independent identity for the group. In fact, some old-guard Taliban leaders such as Mullah Zaeef and Mullah Muttawakil have maintained access to New Delhi over the years. But the current Taliban leadership cannot do so openly. This was made clear after news of the Doha channel was reported by Indian media, and partly explains why New Delhi wouldn’t officially confirm the channel.